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1 Bild is translated variously in the literature as ‘pictu
German word, to underscore the fact that Hertz and Wa b s t r a c t
The Marburg neo-Kantians argue that Hermann von Helmholtz’s empiricist account of the a priori does
not account for certain knowledge, since it is based on a psychological phenomenon, trust in the regular-
ities of nature. They argue that Helmholtz’s account raises the ‘problem of validity’ (Gültigkeitsproblem):
how to establish a warranted claim that observed regularities are based on actual relations. I reconstruct
Heinrich Hertz’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Bild theoretic answer to the problem of validity: that scien-
tists and philosophers can depict the necessary a priori constraints on states of affairs in a given system,
and can establish whether these relations are actual relations in nature. The analysis of necessity within a
system is a lasting contribution of the Bild theory. However, Hertz andWittgenstein argue that the logical
and mathematical sentences of a Bild are rules, tools for constructing relations, and the rules themselves
are meaningless outside the theory. Carnap revises the argument for validity by attempting to give
semantic rules for translation between frameworks. Russell and Quine object that pragmatics better
accounts for the role of a priori reasoning in translating between frameworks. The conclusion of the tale,
then, is a partial vindication of Helmholtz’s original account.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science1. Introduction
In what follows, I will evaluate the influence of Helmholtz’s sign
theory, which pairs an empiricist account of the origin of geometry
in experience with a Humean account of a priori principles as
based on a habitual belief in the regularity of experience. In re-
sponse to Helmholtz, Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer of the
Marburg neo-Kantian school argue that the sign theory does not
answer the problem of the validity of a priori principles as war-
rants for scientific claims. I will present the epistemological theory
that Wittgenstein and Hertz developed to interpret Helmholtz’s
use of signs in response to the problem of validity—the Bild or pic-
ture theory.1 I will argue that the Bild theory gives significant sup-
port to the argument that the a priori has two parts: the
specification of mathematical and logical possibility, and the con-
struction of experiments to test these possibilities.
As Howard (1996), Heidelberger (1998), and Leroux (2001) have
argued, Hertz’s Bild theory is an ancestor of Carnap’s formal seman-
tics (Howard), of Wittgenstein’s account of the sentence–worldll rights reserved.
re’, ‘image’, or ‘model’. A Bild shoul
ittgenstein use the same terminolorelation (Heidelberger), and of the semantic approach to the phi-
losophy of science of Sneed, van Fraassen, and Suppe (Leroux).
One central result of the Bild tradition endures, the definition of
necessity in terms of the relation of a given theory to its models.
However, as Quine, Duhem, and Schlick argue, the validity and
necessity of a priori mathematical inferences is defined only within
a given model, and is not independent of the physical theory in
which the inference is made. Early on, Carnap attempted to make
a semantic argument that all such differences are merely linguistic,
and that each theory differs only in its manner of expression. Car-
nap tried to make such an argument by giving translation rules,
first syntactic, and then, beginning in 1938, semantic. But Quine
and Russell observe that a semantic account is not necessary, and
that it involves Carnap in difficulties. Quine and Russell argue that
Carnap’s semantic account should be replaced with a pragmatic
one, in terms of the expectations that rational agents have given
certain commitments, and the commitments that such agents are
willing and not willing to give up. Thus, by the 1950s, there was
a return to Helmholtz.d not be understood as a visual or mental image or picture, however. I tend to use the
gy.
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The problem of validity (Gültigkeitsproblem) was raised by Her-
mann Lotze, Hermann Cohen, Alois Riehl, Bruno Bauch, and Hein-
rich Rickert2 against naturalist accounts of the a priori. There were
significant differences in the philosophical reasons for raising the
problem of validity: Bauch did so for logicist reasons, Cohen for
neo-Kantian ones.3 However, the common ground is that all these
philosophers argue that naturalism alone does not establish the jus-
tification for the assumption, used in making inductive inferences,
that objects and events experienced will continue to display the
same observed regularities. The problem is a variant of the problem
of induction, since establishing the validity of a principle of infer-
ence, based on regularity, involves making an inference beyond ob-
jects as experienced.4
As Robert DiSalle notes, Helmholtz’s own answer to the prob-
lem of validity was to argue that the a priori is ‘something that
Kant never intended it to be: a species of psychological adaptation
to regularities in the external world’.5 Helmholtz refers to the prin-
ciple on which he bases his own inferences as the ‘transcendental
law of causality’, which he interprets as a belief that observed regu-
larities are stable, for example, that like causes are followed by like
effects. Helmholtz thought that some elements of geometry were
assumptions necessary to making inductive inferences—in particu-
lar, the assumption that rigid bodies that are observed to move with-
out deformation will continue to do so. Helmholtz observes that
without that assumption, it does not seem possible to construct a
system of geometry that accounts for our experience, and so the
assumption is necessary to constructing a geometrical system. But
that does not mean, for Helmholtz, that we have a logical warrant
to accept the assumption as a necessary truth.
Helmholtz’s account raises the question of whether valid prin-
ciples of knowledge are valid because they are presuppositions
necessary to make sense of our actual knowledge, or because they
are rationally justified a priori.6 Helmholtz himself did not see the
second option as a possibility. However, even if it may not be possi-
ble to give a universal rationalist justification for a priori principles,
it is possible to ask why the principles of a particular inference are
valid for that inference, and then to extend it to like cases. The devel-
opment of the picture or Bild theory, a precursor of model theory
that influenced Einstein, Hilbert, and Schrödinger, made answering
this question more urgent, because it allowed for validity to be de-
fined within a given picture or model. This approach presages the
method in formal semantics of treating valid inferences within a the-
ory as valid relative to the class of models the theory implicitly
specifies.
Two of the most influential Bild theorists, Helmholtz’s student
Heinrich Hertz and (in his early work) Ludwig Wittgenstein, were
preoccupied with the problem of validity. In what follows, I will
sketch the history of Hertz’s and Wittgenstein’s answers to the
question of the validity of a priori cognition, both of which go well
beyond Helmholtz’s psychological account, but which make use of
Helmholtz’s empiricist sign theory. First, in this section, I will
sketch Helmholtz’s argument that, while spatial measurement is
derived from experience, determining spatial and causal relations
depends on postulating lawlike regularities of experience. Helm-
holtz argues that such determinations require trust in lawlike pos-2 Amongst many others.
3 For a book length discussion of the problem of validity and its history, see Liebert (19
4 In his Logik, Hermann Lotze has a fascinating discussion of this as the problem of how
independent existence. See Liebert (1914), pp. 204 ff.
5 DiSalle (1993), pp. 505–506.
6 This question would become a key point of disagreement between Helmholtz and Poi
7 Helmholtz (1977a [1870]), p. 19.
8 DiSalle (1993), pp. 499–500.tulates as principles of organization of a system of signs. Second, I
will show how Helmholtz’s use of these postulates as rules in his
fluid mechanics contributed to the methodology of Hertz’s and
Wittgenstein’s picture or Bild theory, which gives a preliminary an-
swer to the question of the validity of a priori demonstrations
using signs. I will show how the Bild theory supports the claim that
it is rational to believe some a priori claims about constraints on
the states of a system, even claims based on counterfactual under-
lying stipulations. Finally, I will assess the consequences for the
Bild theory of Russell’s and Quine’s objection that our warrant for
belief in these claims is pragmatic, not semantic.
The most potent challenge to Kant’s notion of the apriority of
space and causality in the mid-nineteenth century comes from
Helmholtz, who argued that geometry is empirical since it is based
on spatial measurement, and causality is based on trust in the reg-
ularities of nature. In the case of geometry, as Helmholtz argues in
‘On the origin and significance of the axioms of geometry’:
any comparative estimation of magnitudes, or measurement of
spatial relationships, starts from a presupposition about the
physical behavior of certain bodies, whether of our own body
or of applied measuring instruments. This presupposition may
incidentally have the highest degree of probability and be in
the best agreement with all physical circumstances otherwise
known to us, but it still goes beyond the domain of pure spatial
intuitions.7
Helmholtz’s argument seemed to rule out an a priori status for
geometry. However, as DiSalle has observed, Helmholtz’s view pre-
sents an interesting dichotomy:
while Helmholtz certainly understood geometry to be an
empirical science in some sense, he also recognized its status
as a formal deductive structure that stands independently of
its intuitive or sensory content.8
For Helmholtz, spatial relations are constructed partly through
inference from experience and partly in response to expectations
about the regularity of experience.
In ‘The facts in perception’, perhaps his best known epistemo-
logical essay, Helmholtz argues that spatial relations cannot be de-
rived immediately from sensation. Sensation presents us with
signs of the sensations themselves, which do not necessarily
resemble the objects of those sensations. For instance, the analysis
of stereoscopic vision shows that what appears to us as a single im-
age is in fact two retinal images resolved into one. Perspective can
distort size in our everyday experience: when you are looking at
the moon in the night sky, you can cover it with your finger.
According to Helmholtz’s explanation of the physiology of percep-
tion, such properties as configuration and size are not derived di-
rectly from sensation. Instead, perception (Wahrnehmung) goes
beyond sensation to present us with objects constructed within a
system of signs, according to an inductive postulate of lawful
regularity:
By moving the touching finger along the objects, one comes to
know the sequence in which their impressions offer themselves.
This sequence shows itself to be independent of whether one
touches with one finger or another. It is moreover not a
uniquely determined sequence, whose elements one must14).
to establish the validity of Platonic ideas without trying to establish their being or
ncaré. See Cassirer (1978 [1946]), pp. 44 ff.
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order to get from one to another; thus it is not a linear
sequence, but a surfacelike ‘one beside another’, or in Riemann’s
terminology a second-order manifold. That all this is so is easily
seen.9
Helmholtz argues that we base our inference that an object of expe-
rience has certain spatial properties on the regular sequences or
orderings of our impressions. For Helmholtz, it is reasonable to infer
from these regularities that an object in fact has the spatial proper-
ties it appears to have.
Helmholtz argues that we construct spatial determinations by
learning to interpret the signs that correspond to sensations from
our nerve endings. Helmholtz observes, ‘to the sensations from
spatially distinct nerve endings correspond various determinate
Localzeichen [literally ‘‘place signs”], whose spatial meaning is
learned by us’.10 Our sensations give us signs, not direct copies
of their objects. These signs may have as little resemblance to their
objects as the written name ‘Winston Churchill’ has to Churchill in
the flesh.11 Perceptual space is a general Localzeichen that relates
sensations to each other.12 According to Helmholtz’s explanation
of the physiology of perception, even such relations as separation
in space and relative spatial position are not drawn directly from
experience, but are constructed in the sign system, which presup-
poses a postulate of lawlike regularity.13 That our experience con-
forms to law is the warrant that it is experience of actual
phenomena: ‘The lawlike is therefore the essential presupposition
for the character of the actual’.14 The general law of causality is
for Helmholtz a ‘transcendental’ law, an a priori condition for con-
structing any theory that corresponds to actual objects, that is, ob-
jects that can be present in the sign system.15 This law, as is
suggested by the word ‘transcendental’, cannot be derived from
experience.16 It is based on our ‘trust’ (Vertrauen) that like causes
will be followed by like effects, and that observed regularities will
continue to obtain.17
Helmholtz argues that we must trust to the ‘lawlikeness of
everything that happens’ to construct any theory of nature.18 Mea-
suring the spatial properties of an object will consist of making judg-
ments of the congruence between the measuring standard and the
object under investigation, by placing a meter stick along the surface
of a table, for instance. Such judgments of congruence depend on the
assumption of the ‘lawlikeness of everything that happens’. As I am
moving the meter stick along the surface of the table, the meter stick9 Helmholtz (1977b [1878]), p. 127.
10 Helmholtz (1968 [1869]), p. 57. Here, Helmholtz cites Hermann Lotze as the source fo
11 Compare Helmholtz (1903), pp. 41 ff.
12 Helmholtz’s empiricist sign theory was influenced by Mill’s theory of induction. Howeve
on Helmholtz, see Hatfield (1991), pp. 200 ff.
13 It may be profitable to compare Helmholtz’s theory to Ruth Millikan’s modern sign
representation to indicate its represented, clearly it is not just a natural sign, a sign th
representation for the system itself’ (Millikan, 1989, p. 284). Millikan contends that the func
representation’ (ibid., p. 287). This account makes a useful distinction between signs’ role
physical module that is an inherited adaptation. Millikan argues for a naturalized accoun
dispositions that have been selected for are supplemented by abilities developed while lea
between innate and learned dispositions.
14 Helmholtz (1977b [1878]), p. 140.
15 Ibid., p. 142.
16 Helmholtz does not use the word ‘transcendental’ in Kant’s sense, that cause and e
Helmholtz means that causal relations cannot be represented directly as empirical relatio
system’ with which we interpret our sensations and which makes experience of causal rela
can acquire knowledge of the lawful order of our representations without arguing that th
contradictio in adjecto to want to represent the real (das Reele) or Kant’s Ding an sich in posi
often discussed. What we can attain, however, is an acquaintance with the lawlike order in
impressions’ (ibid., p. 141).
17 ‘Every inductive inference is based on trusting that an item of lawlike behaviour, which
under observation. This is a trust in the lawlikeness of everything that happens’ (ibid., p.
18 Ibid., p. 142.
19 Ibid., p. 141.
20 Ibid., p. 140. For an explanation of what Helmholtz means by the ‘actual in nature’, seshould not shrink in comparison to the table, or the measurements
will not be valid. Helmholtz argues that since we can represent cau-
sal relations directly in a geometrical system, we have access to ‘the
lawlike order in the realm of the actual’, though ‘only as portrayed in
the sign system of our sense impressions’.19 The system requires a
postulate that regular or ‘lawful’ relations obtain. If my meter stick
were to shrink and to extend randomly with respect to the table
as I measure the table, I would not be able to arrive at a stable value
for the size of the table.
Helmholtz argues that if the philosopher or scientist trusts to
the postulate that observed regularities are regularities in nature,
most of the content previously annexed to the a priori turns out
to originate in experience. Helmholtz replaces Kant’s pure intu-
itions of space and time and a priori pure principles with trust (Ver-
trauen) that observed regularities will continue to obtain. The
content of judgments based on spatiotemporal concepts and causal
laws is constructed entirely from features of observed phenomena
within the sign system. The a priori thus shrinks to our trust or be-
lief that the regularity of experience to which we adapt our cogni-
tion maps on to what Helmholtz calls the ‘actual’ (wirklich) in
nature, that is, ‘that which lies behind the change of appearances
and acts upon us’.20
The Marburg school of neo-Kantianism reacted to Helmholtz’s
research by defending a limited notion of Kant’s a priori. Hermann
Cohen, the founder of the school, began his career in the 1870s by
responding to debates over whether Kant’s a priori could be natu-
ralized. In an appreciation of Cohen’s work in 1912, Ernst Cassirer
argued that the value of Cohen’s philosophy is in posing the ques-
tion of the validity of the principles of judgment that Helmholtz
uses, for example the principles of organization of the sign system.
Cassirer remarks that Helmholtz, despite himself, gave a naturalist
interpretation of the principles for constructing objects in the sign
system:
Even when it was most prevalent, ‘naturalism’ as a metaphysi-
cal view never achieved unlimited dominance. In the circles of
speculative philosophy, Schopenhauer’s idealist doctrine was
opposed to it, and in research circles, most notably, Helm-
holtz’s epistemological research (which was, again, linked
deliberately to Kant) was opposed to it. But one can see the
power exercised by the methodology of naturalism even in
these conflicts, even where one thought the real content of
its worldview had been surmounted. True, from his metaphys-r his notion of Localzeichen.
r, Helmholtz revises Mill’s view significantly. For a detailed account of Mill’s influence
theory. In ‘Biosemantics’, Millikan argues, ‘If it really is the function of an inner
at you or I looking on might interpret. It must be one that functions as a sign or
tion of a ‘sign’ (an aspect of a representation) is determined by its role in a ‘system of
in constructing representations in response to stimuli and their function as part of a
t of how representations arise, but argues that in the process of representing, innate
rning to represent phenomena. Helmholtz’s view is based as well on this cooperation
ffect is a pure principle of the understanding. By calling causality ‘transcendental’
ns between objects or events as sensed, but only as ordering principles of the ‘sign
tions, and the spatial relations described above, possible. Thus, Helmholtz argues, we
e laws are pure principles with a priori content. ‘I need not explain to you that it is a
tive terms, without absorbing it into the form of our manner of representation. This is
the realm of the actual, admittedly only as portrayed in the sign system of our sense
has been observed up to now, will also prove true in all cases which have not yet come
142).
e Heidelberger (1998), pp. 10 ff.
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of the crucible and of the alembic’, but nonetheless in his epis-
temology he used, utterly naïvely and without critical scrutiny,
the language that natural science, and in particular physiology,
had constructed. In fact, Helmholtz made this language incom-
parably sharper and more precise; but even he used it far
beyond the limits within which it is valid in a strict sense,
and within which alone it possesses a real meaning beyond
the metaphorical. The entire doctrine of the a priori appears
from now on as a mere extension of a certain individual result
of natural science.21
The ‘individual result’ to which Cassirer refers is Helmholtz’s super-
visor Johannes Müller’s argument in physiology, that to each sensa-
tion corresponds a specific ‘sense energy’, or configuration of a
nerve ending, that is a sign of the actual object. As we have seen,
Helmholtz gives this view an epistemological backing by means of
the theory of signs (Zeichentheorie). In the Marburg neo-Kantian tra-
dition Cassirer was describing, and to which he belongs, the ‘puzzle
of cognition’ is understood as the question of how a priori cogni-
tions can be valid: the Gültigkeitsproblem, as described above. Cas-
sirer argues that Helmholtz uses the language of physiology
beyond its valid domain of application. After all, Cassirer observes,
demonstrating that a principle of organization of a sign system is
the actual principle that a given physiological theory uses to ac-
count for our actual perceptions does not answer the epistemolog-
ical question of the validity of that cognition. How do we prove that
the ordering principles of the sign system are the necessary rela-
tions between phenomena or events?Thus, all these efforts effectively take on the color of the very
systems they are fighting. They search in vain to analyze the
whole critically, meanwhile taking one element of the cognition
of nature as fixed. The a priori truths, understood in terms of
‘type classification’, become a particular class of psychophysical
‘actualities’, and thus inevitably are classified under, and subor-
dinated to, the conditions for cognition of actuality, rather than
being able to ground them and analyze them independently.
Likewise, whether phenomenal actuality is interpreted as ‘a
product of the brain’ or, in seemingly refined usage, as ‘a prod-
uct of representation’, the mere concept of a ‘product’ still begs
the entire question from the standpoint of epistemology.22
It is odd to hear a neo-Kantian speak of analysing the a priori inde-
pendently of its role as one of the ‘conditions for cognition’. How-
ever, Cassirer is not arguing that the a priori exists independently
of our knowledge, that is, he is not arguing for mathematical or log-
ical Platonism. Instead, Cassirer argues that if a philosopher can
analyse a mathematical or logical rule only as it helps to achieve
a particular result, in a particular, given domain, that philosopher
cannot answer the epistemological questions: whether that rule is
a necessary condition for that result, and whether it is valid to apply
to other domains.21 Cassirer (2005 [1912]), p. 114.
22 Ibid.
23 Much of the scholarship on Helmholtz’s theory of the a priori has focused on his acco
writings, argues that Helmholtz’s related theories of epistemology and of geometry are the
motion, for instance, is already consigned to a purely historical interest. (See Schlick’s no
Helmholtz’s work on fluid dynamics is directly relevant to his epistemology.
24 See, e.g., Emanuel (2000), pp. 8 ff.
25 These laws are in use today, in the following form from a modern textbook:
1. Fluid particles originally free of vorticity remain free of vorticity.
2. Fluid particles on a vortex line remain on a vortex line, so that vortex lines move
3. The strength of the vorticity is proportional to the length of the vortex line. (Fuh
26 See, e.g., Smith (1998), pp. 254 ff., and Emanuel (2000), pp. 8 ff.
27 As Kelvin emphasizes in his Introduction to Königsberger (1906).3. Signs and the a priori
In the above presentation of the problem of validity, I have
emphasized Helmholtz’s psychological argument, what Cassirer
calls his ‘naturalism’, about the justification of the principles of
organization of the sign system. However, in his theory of fluid
dynamics, Helmholtz uses a priori reasoning about the principles
of the sign system to resolve a conflict at the level of mathematical
explanation.23 This practical result presages the later Bild theoretic
approach to the problem of validity: the argument that a priori rea-
soning can yield meaningful claims about the relationship between
the logical and mathematical rules of a Bild and the valid results or
theorems that can be proven within that system. However, this ap-
proach does not give logic and mathematics enough independence
to satisfy the Marburg school, as we will see later.
In fluid dynamics, Helmholtz was faced with a set of mathemat-
ical equations based on inconsistent a priori assumptions. Euler’s
equations require fluids to be continuous, while Lagrange’s equa-
tions depended on the hypothesis that fluids are made up of dis-
crete particles.24 To solve the problem, Helmholtz introduced
concepts that are in use still. Assuming that a given fluid is free of
viscosity, and perfectly continuous, Helmholtz showed how its mo-
tion could be determined precisely using two conceptual notions.
The first is the notion of the ‘vorticity’ of a fluid, or its average rota-
tion within a region. The second is a ‘vortex line’, which is the tan-
gent to the vorticity of a fluid at a single point. Using these
concepts, Helmholtz was able to formulate a single set of laws of mo-
tion for non-viscous fluids, and to prove that all the results derivable
from Euler’s and Lagrange’s systems can be derived from his laws as
well.25 Helmholtz’s laws of motion are still in use, because they de-
scribe fluid motion correctly. However, Helmholtz’s laws require flu-
ids to be perfect continua. Since Helmholtz’s laws are still in use, it is
an open secret that, while the classical laws of fluid motion require
fluids to be perfect continua, our best empirical evidence reveals that
fluids are granular, that is, are made up of discrete particles.26
Helmholtz did not introduce these concepts to oppose atomic
theory—in fact, he famously supported that theory.27 But for Helm-
holtz concepts such as vortex lines are manipulations of signs, and
signs do not have to mimic the properties of real objects. Reasoning
using signs is a tool to investigate objects, but signs are not copies of
the objects themselves. In ‘The facts in perception’, Helmholtz argues
that the fact that we visualize objects close up as larger than identi-
cal objects farther away is due to the fact that objects in perspective
are signs. A physiologist may demonstrate mathematically how we
construct an image using perspective. When that physiologist is
faced with evidence that two objects differentiated by perspective
in a visual image are identical, why should he abandon his explana-
tion of the relation between the objects as perceived? It is still cor-
rect. According to Helmholtz’s epistemology, properties such as
separation in space and distance are relations between signs. So if
our best mathematical description of fluids is that they are perfect
continua, why should a physicist be worried if presented with evi-unt of geometrical axioms. Moritz Schlick, in his Notes to Helmholtz’s Epistemological
most enduring elements of his work. Schlick argues that Helmholtz’s theory of fluid
tes to Helmholtz, 1977a, on p. xxxiv and following). However, I will argue here that
with the fluid.
s et al., 1999, p. 736).
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fluids, which do not have to resemble the fluids themselves.
As Cassirer points out, though, it is difficult to see how to eval-
uate whether our scientific claims are justified, if the sign theory
countenances inconsistent underlying hypotheses about the actual
objects under investigation. In this case, Helmholtz’s laws of fluid
motion require the a priori postulate that fluids are perfect con-
tinua, and our best theory of the makeup of those fluids is that they
are granular. Surely, given Helmholtz’s own empiricist epistemo-
logical views, it would be better for Helmholtz’s fluid laws at least
to approach more closely an accurate description of the phenom-
ena. Here is a key problem for Helmholtz’s psychological justifica-
tion for the a priori postulate of regularity as governing the sign
system. A scientist can construct a theory that does not map on
to the known properties of the objects considered independently,
but can argue that the theory nonetheless describes the phenom-
ena as represented in the sign system. In that case, it is reasonable
to ask: what is our justification for constructions in the sign sys-
tem? Helmholtz’s answer is that wemust trust that the regularities
of nature that that system describes map on to regularities in nat-
ure. The philosophers who pose the problem of validity find this
answer unsatisfying.
Helmholtz’s actual practice in his theory of fluid dynamics pre-
sages the Bild-theoretic answer to the problem of validity: defining
the relationship between a given principle or law and the results
that can be derived within a theory as necessary within that the-
ory. Helmholtz shows that Euler’s and Lagrange’s formulations of
fluid dynamics can be reformulated to have identical deductive
consequences—he shows, in other words, that there is a minimal
theory that captures all the results of Euler’s and Lagrange’s formu-
lations, and that resolves the conflicts between the two. But this is
a proof that the results obtain, not only in Euler’s and Lagrange’s
formulations of fluid dynamics, but in any consistent formulation
that is a model of Helmholtz’s laws. In other words, Helmholtz’s
proof is an attempt at a proof (which would be given, now, in mod-
el-theoretic terms) that there is a necessary, not just a psychologi-
cal, relationship between his laws and the provable theorems of
fluid dynamics.
Helmholtz has a profound influence on the subsequent develop-
ment of the picture or Bild theory constructed by Helmholtz’s pupil
Heinrich Hertz and later by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Helmholtz’s
epistemology, and his way of resolving problems in science as
exemplified by his laws of fluid dynamics, pose an early challenge
to the analytic–synthetic distinction. This is a challenge that Helm-
holtz himself did not make explicitly. However, the development
of the Bild theory treats much that previously was considered ana-
lytic as in fact synthetic: a priori reasoning using logic and mathe-
matics, in particular. The Bild tradition replaces analytic ‘truths’
with rules of construction of a Bild.
The roots of the Bild-theoretic undermining of the analytic–syn-
thetic distinction are found in Helmholtz’s theory, in his theory of
signs and even in his fluid dynamics as sketched here. Construc-
tions in the sign system are based on a postulate of regularity,
for which we have no a priori warrant, only the need for some such
postulate to construct a theory. For instance, the proposition ‘Flu-28 The vorticity of a fluid, as Helmholtz defines it, is its average rotation in a chosen are
tangents to the vorticity vector of the fluid in that region. The postulate of continuity also a
region of a fluid, and when the area around each is taken to a minimum, the vortex lines
29 Hertz observes that the Hamiltonian formulation of mechanics uses a distinct math
mathematical principle of Newtonian or ‘classical’ mechanics is a generalization of Newton’
principle from which Hamilton derives the Euler-Lagrange equations. These principles dicta
repulsive forces between particles, usually with differential equations. Hamiltonian mecha
energy of a system (Introduction to Hertz (1956 [1894])).
30 Ibid., p. 1; translation revised. For accounts of the relationship between Hertz, seman
(2001).
31 ‘The subject-matter of the first book is completely independent of experience. All asseids are perfect continua’ is neither an analytic truth nor an infer-
ence from observation in Helmholtz’s theory. It is a postulate of
regularity, a presupposition necessary to constructing Helmholtz’s
theory that makes the observed behaviour of fluids comprehensi-
ble. As such, when it is used to make predictions in the theory,
the proposition says something about the observed phenomena:
for instance, the postulate of continuity predicts that we can find
the vorticity, or average rotation, of the fluid in any region, how-
ever small.28 Two aspects of Helmholtz’s view carry over to Hertz
and Wittgenstein: that our theories depict actual objects, instead
of being direct copies of those objects; and that the fundamental
epistemological relation is between a construction in a sign system
and the actual objects.
While writing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein read Hertz’s Principles
of mechanics, which was influenced by Helmholtz’s sign theory, but
which interprets that theory in a Bild- or picture-theoretic frame-
work. Hertz, like Helmholtz, argues that spatial and temporal rela-
tions can be represented only in a sign system. However, for Hertz,
judgments about relations between objects are constructed within
a Bild, variously translated as ‘symbol’ or ‘picture’ in the literature,
although Bild can also have the sense of ‘model’. A Bild for Hertz is
related to Helmholtz’s sign system, but for Hertz, a Bild is con-
strained by its fundamental mathematical principle, which will
be different for distinct Bilder, and by the basic logical notions
and conceptual primitives of the Bild.29
Like Helmholtz’s sign systems, Hertz’s Bilder depend on the
specification of signs. In his Introduction to the Principles of
mechanics, Hertz argues that
We form for ourselves symbols (innere Scheinbilder) or repre-
sentations of objects; and the form we give them is such that
the necessary consequents of the symbols in thought are always
the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things
pictured.30
What guarantees the mapping between necessary consequence in
thought and necessary consequence in nature? In the first Part of
the Principles, Hertz argues that for any given system, we can give
an a priori account of the possible geometrical configurations of
that system, as well as the possible transformations of the system
from one state to the next.31 This account is arrived at by deduction
from the basic principle of the system, e.g., the principle of least ac-
tion, plus the basic logical and mathematical axioms and the funda-
mental notions (for example space, time, mass). Experience will
answer the question of whether our a priori constraints, which pre-
dict the next observed configuration, capture the observed effects.
For Hertz, it is possible, then, to show why our scientific expla-
nation of the consequences of a given mechanical experiment de-
scribes actual relations. If the system is constructed properly and
the experiment is successful, we can show that the experiment,
when plugged in to the possible configurations established a priori,
rules out at least some of the other possible configurations of the
system. This yields a way to test the Bild in experience: if the rela-
tions within the Bild contradict the observed relations, the Bild is
‘incorrect’. Further, if the Bild is logically inconsistent, it is not ‘per-
missible’. However, two Bilder can be correct and permissible, buta of the fluid, represented by a vector. The vortex lines of a fluid in a region are the
llows Helmholtz to argue that when vortex lines are drawn around the boundary of a
will converge on a single vortex filament. Vortex filaments are now called vortices.
ematical principle from the Newtonian formulation. According to Hertz, the basic
s third law of motion, and the basic principle of Hamiltonian mechanics is a variational
te the methods used within the two Bilder. Newtonian mechanics maps attractive and
nics uses integral sums to evaluate the relationship between the potential and kinetic
tics, and theories of causality, see Heidelberger (1998), Howard (1996), and Leroux
rtions made are a priori judgments in Kant’s sense’ (Hertz (1956 [1894]), §1).
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depict the same results differently. In that case, Hertz appeals to
the Zweckmäßigkeit or ‘fitness to the purpose’ of the Bild. Fitness
to the purpose is a relative criterion: usually, in the progress of sci-
ence, choosing between two correct Bilderwill be a matter of dem-
onstrating that one Bild, and not the other, models the phenomena
univocally (eindeutig), by coordinating a single relation within the
Bild to a single, corresponding relation in nature. If we can show
that a model is univocal, Hertz argues, we have constructed an
argument that a necessary relation in the model is necessary in
nature.32
Conceiving of the a priori as a set of possible configurations of a
system is the link between Hertz and Wittgenstein.33 For Hertz, the
a priori configurations are the possible geometrical configurations of
a system of mechanics; for Wittgenstein, they are the possible logical
configurations of a Tractarian Bild, usually translated as ‘picture’.34
As Wittgenstein puts it, ‘we make Bilder of facts for ourselves’, where
a Bild is a ‘model of actuality (Wirklichkeit)’, and ‘the total actuality is
the world’.35 (Wittgenstein, like Helmholtz, uses the term ‘actuality’,
not ‘reality’, to describe states of affairs as modelled by the sign sys-
tem.) For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, Bilder are logical means,
composed of propositions, of depicting states of affairs. Elementary
propositions depict the possibilities of states of affairs:
The possible truth conditions of the elementary propositions
refer to the possibilities of the existence or nonexistence of
states of affairs.36
A name ‘is not to be analyzed further by any definition: it is a prim-
itive sign (Urzeichen)’.37 A logical Bild can look like a truth table. A
truth table contains names (P and Q, for example) and connectives
(i.e., if . . . then, and, or). A set of truth tables for all the connectives
can exhibit formally all the logical possibilities associated with the
primitive names, such as P and Q, for those connectives. For Hertz,
the basic principle and the axioms of a Bild are the rules for deter-
mining the possible configurations of a system. For Wittgenstein, lo-
gic gives the rules for determining the truth conditions, and thus the
meaning, of a proposition.
For Wittgenstein, a Bild refers to the world if and only if its
internal form, the relations between its elements, is identical with
the actual form.
The form of depiction (Abbildung) is the possibility that things
are related to each other as are the elements of the Bild.38What every Bild, of whatever form, must have in common with
actuality, in order to depict it—correctly or falsely—is logical
form, that is, the form of actuality.39
So if a Bild shows that ‘If A then B’ is true, then it is a correct depic-
tion if ‘If A then B’ picks out an actual state of affairs. In other words,
to trace Hertz’s influence, we can construct our Bilder so that if ‘If A32 Two points are relevant here. First, as an anonymous referee for this journal pointe
requirements for representing necessary connections in a Bild. After all, few if any experim
theory and experiment’. It is an interesting further question whether Hertz thought necessa
what Kant calls a regulative ideal. Second, that there is a warrant for a claim that necessary
infallible or indefeasible, of course.
33 ‘The absolute division in Hertz’s and Helmholtz’s philosophies of science between a p
analysis of language and cognition’ (Hyder, 2002, p. 47).
34 Again, I will not translate Bild as ‘picture’ here, however, because it is too easily confus
that Hertz and Wittgenstein use the same term.
35 Wittgenstein (1922), 2.1, 2.12, 2.063; all translations from this work are my own.
36 Ibid., 4.3.
37 Ibid., 3.26.
38 Ibid., 2.151.
39 Ibid., 2.18.
40 Wittgenstein (1961), p. 7, entry from 29 September 1914; cited in Kenny (2006), pp.
41 Note that the claim that the reconstruction gives a valid reason to accuse a driver o
defeasible.then B’ is a necessary consequence in thought, and it can be de-
picted as such in an ‘experiment’ (see below), then we have a war-
rant to argue that it is a necessary consequence in nature.
Making judgments is then a matter of depicting necessary rela-
tions based on the prior specification of the possibilities and their
configuration in the propositions of the Bild. As Anthony Kenny re-
marks, in his notebooks from 1914Wittgenstein describes the rela-
tionship between experiment and depiction as follows:
In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimen-
tally. (As when in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is
represented by means of dolls, etc.). This must yield the nature
of truth straight away (if I were not blind).40
In court, Wittgenstein saw a reconstruction of a traffic accident, in
which lawyers used toy models to represent a lorry and a car that
had hit each other. To determine who was at fault, the lawyers
reconstructed the accident, and showed what the relative positions
of the lorry and the car would have been. Wittgenstein pointed out
that, although the toy cars are artificial, their relative positions de-
picted necessary relations. Only the possible configurations of the
cars depicted the accident. Perhaps the toy models were made of
plastic rather than steel, for instance. Nonetheless, it is true that if
a manipulation of the toy cars (the experiment) shows that one dri-
ver was at fault, the reconstruction is a valid reason to accuse that
driver of causing the accident.41 In the case of a valid reconstruction,
the lawyers can demonstrate to anyone’s satisfaction—who is not
‘blind’—that it would have been impossible, given the relative posi-
tions of the toy cars, for the other car to have caused the accident.
For Wittgenstein, the reconstruction of the accident creates ‘a world’
that depicts experimentally the logical possibilities for the event.
The toy cars and the fluid lines are manipulations of signs, in the
sense that they depict regularities in the behaviour of signs.
According to the Bild theory, constructions in the sign system de-
pict or symbolize objects, they do not mirror or copy the properties
of the objects. Helmholtz chose to use vortex lines to symbolize the
tangent vectors to the rotation of a fluid in a region. Helmholtz and
generations of physicists following him were able to prove theo-
rems about fluid motion using the notions of vortex lines and vor-
ticity. They were able to depict ‘a world’, in Wittgenstein’s sense,
that includes vortex lines and vorticity. According to Hertz’s and
Wittgenstein’s theories, Helmholtz et al. are able to prove that
there is a warrant to think that the relations between vortex lines
and vorticity that are necessary in the sign system are necessary in
nature, instead of assuming or trusting that observed regularities
are actual regularities in nature. That does not imply an endorse-
ment of the claim that vortex lines are real features of objects,
any more than the toy cars in Wittgenstein’s court were the real
cars involved in the accident. But it is not a good enough defence
on the part of the driver who was at fault to claim that, since the
cars used in the court reconstruction were not made of the samed out, it is unclear whether there are any actual cases that meet Hertz’s stringent
ents rule out all alternative interpretations—this is part of Duhem’s point in ‘Physical
ry relations could be represented in a Bild, or whether representing such relations was
relations in a Bild are necessary relations in nature does not mean that that warrant is
riori ‘spatial’ structures and their a posteriori contents is replicated in Wittgenstein’s
ed with a mental or visual image. Instead, I use the German, because this emphasizes
42–43, and discussed at pp. 44 ff.
f being at fault does not mean that it is the only possible evidence, or that it is not
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a sceptic who argues that the laws of fluid dynamics must be inva-
lid because they require the counterfactual stipulation that fluids
be perfect continua would not be able to prove her case.42
Within his framework, Helmholtz was able to prove that ‘The
strength of the vorticity (rotation) of a fluid is proportional to the
length of the vortex line’. Helmholtz himself argues that the law
cannot be derived directly from experience. Hertz adds that such
laws must have an a priori warrant to be valid, in this case, because
the law depends (1) on the counterfactual assumption that fluids
are perfect continua and (2) on Helmholtz’s specification of the
signs ‘vorticity’ and ‘vortex line’, which are not derivable directly
from experience. Helmholtz argues that reasoning using (1) and
(2) is acceptable because these hypotheses are merely principles
for inductive inference, and we cannot construct any theory of fluid
dynamics without assuming some such principle.
Hertz and Wittgenstein argue that there is good evidence for
the claim that, given a certain specification of fundamental notions
(signs) and mathematical and logical principles, we can make war-
ranted claims a priori about the possible configurations of a given
system. The signs and rules do not need to be true or even mean-
ingful. Wittgenstein, in particular, argues that names are primitive
signs that are not logically analysable, and that logical and mathe-
matical rules are either senseless or nonsense. Nonetheless, while a
priori claims about possible configurations in the Bild theory do not
have the thick content of the Kantian synthetic a priori, and in par-
ticular do not license claims that subjects have pure intuitions of
space and time, they are instances of a priori reasoning that go be-
yond the systematisation of previous mathematics.
Using Helmholtz’s laws to achieve fruitful results in science
does not require arguing that it is an a priori truth that fluids are
perfect continua. Further, inferences based on Helmholtz’s laws
must be demonstrated in Kant’s ‘tribunal of experience’, or Witt-
genstein’s court of experiment, to be valid. The laws are valid prin-
ciples of inference, but not a priori truths about the fluids
themselves. The independent properties of the fluids themselves
are not evaluated in the sign theory, only the signs that we use
to refer to the fluids, and the lawlike relations that hold between
successive representations of the fluids. The use of a priori reason-
ing in the Bild theory is to constrain our elaboration of the possible
configurations of that theory.
Helmholtz’s law is not a claim about the real properties of flu-
ids, nor is it meant to be. It is a rule governing the possible trans-
formations of a dynamical system from one configuration to
another. Without some such rules, proving theorems within the
system would not be possible. Within the sign theory framework,
without which it is not possible to reconstruct Helmholtz’s reason-
ing, mathematical principles govern the possible transformations
of elements of the theory from one configuration to another. For in-
stance, it is possible to map the possible moves from one configu-
ration of a Rubik’s cube to another. A mathematical rule governs
the possible transformations between one state, or configuration,
of the system to another. Given a mathematical rule, and a set of
states of affairs, for example, two configurations of the faces of
the cube, we can specify the possible transformations or paths
from one configuration to another within the system. However,
the mathematical rule does not make any verifiable statement
about the properties of the cube.42 There are many examples of the use of toy models, like Wittgenstein’s toy cars, in the h
electromagnetic ether are two of the most famous. These are not formal models in the cont
relation of electromagnetic forces. Maxwell did not argue that electromagnetism is made up
depicts necessary relations between electromagnetic forces, just as Wittgenstein’s toy c
examples in his classic paper ‘A confutation of convergent realism’ (Laudan, 1981).
43 For instance, Cassirer argues that while the axioms of a particular geometry may not be
any physical theory. As Friedman (2000) observes, there is some common ground betwee
44 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 74 ff.The difference between Helmholtz’s approach and the Bild-the-
oretic approach of Hertz and Wittgenstein is that, for Helmholtz,
our expectation that one state will follow another is based on trust
that observed regularities in nature are actual regularities. Hertz
and Wittgenstein respond that within a given system, this trust
can be shown to be based on a demonstrable correspondence, be-
tween a relation in the Bild and a relation in nature, for Hertz, or
between the logical form of a proposition and actual relations in
the world, for Wittgenstein.4. Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Bild theory had
replaced Helmholtz’s sign theory. Early on, the Bild theory answers
the problem of validity by arguing that there is a necessary relation
between a given set of a priori laws or postulates and the theorems
provable within a Bild. Cohen and Cassirer cite Hertz’s Bild theory
approvingly, as a sound answer to the problem of validity. How-
ever, both argue that Hertz’s and Wittgenstein’s version does not
give enough independence to the mathematical and logical rules
that constitute relations in the Bild.43 The Marburg school argu-
ment, to which Cassirer subscribed early on, was that since a priori
relations are necessary to constructing a system of natural science,
they generate or constitute objects insofar as we can know them,
and thus statements about such relations are warranted a priori.
But such arguments for independence became progressively
more difficult to support. The development of the Bild theory, along
with the progress of science over the twentieth century, under-
mines the argument that a fixed set of a priori principles of logic
or mathematics are necessary to the constitution of a given set of
objects or concepts. Over the twentieth century, mathematicians
and scientists delighted in giving more and more proofs that the
same results could be accounted for using distinct a priori assump-
tions. In that case, it is difficult to argue for any necessary stable
content for the a priori. It is possible to show that the relation be-
tween theoretical framework and scientific result is necessary
within a given model, but not that the model itself is necessary
to capturing the result.
The Bild theory itself is not challenged by these results. Hertz
and Wittgenstein argue that logical and mathematical rules are va-
lid only for making determinations within a given Bild. Such rules
do not have any validity outside a Bild. In particular, a rule valid in
one Bild may not be valid in another. For instance, Hertz argues
that Newton’s law of universal gravitation, expressed in terms of
an inverse square force between point masses, has no sense in a
Hamiltonian framework based on energy transfer. However, the
question of how to define mathematical and logical propositions
as inter-theoretically valid remained of great philosophical inter-
est. As Friedman (2000) explains, early in his career Carnap picks
up a project related to the Marburg defence of the independent
validity of mathematical and logical relations.44 Carnap’s analysis
of logical syntax is an attempt to show that such differences in con-
tent are merely linguistic, for example, that the content is stable, but
that the language, the means of expressing the content, changes.
By 1938, however, Carnap saw the difficulties with the syntactic
approach, and began to develop a semantic analysis of translation
between languages. In 1945, Russell, in an appreciation of the his-istory of science. Faraday’s model of the atom and Maxwell’s cylindrical model of the
emporary, semantic sense. Maxwell used rotating cylinders to depict his notion of the
of rotating cylinders in reality. Instead, he argued that the rotating cylinder toy model
ars depict what really happened in an accident. Larry Laudan gives several similar
a priori universal truths, we must choose some group of transformations to construct
n Cassirer’s and Carnap’s approaches (see, e.g., pp. 70 ff.).
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shift from the early theory that logical truth depends only on syn-
tax, to a later view that logical truth depends on semantics.45 Rus-
sell characterized the shift as follows:
It was always obvious that ‘empirical truth’ must be defined
semantically: there is no syntactical difference between ‘I had
coffee for breakfast’ and ‘I had tea for breakfast’, but on most
days one of these is true and the other false. A sentence of pure
logic, on the other hand, can, given the rules of syntax, be
known to be true (or false) by its form. Nevertheless, Carnap
now holds that even in pure logic it is in virtue of its significance
that a sentence is true (or false), and that therefore, even in this
sphere, it is semantics, not syntax, that is involved.46
Part of the reason for Carnap’s shift can be seen already in the his-
tory of the Bild theory. You can prove the same theorems in Helm-
holtz’s Bild as in Euler’s and Lagrange’s theories. But Euler’s and
Lagrange’s theories are inconsistent with each other. So in this case,
we can construct a Bild that allows us to prove equivalents of all the
theorems of both given theories, but that does not incorporate all
the analytic a priori claims of the two theories—if it did, it would
be inconsistent. So how can we say that there is any necessary, ana-
lytic content to the a priori? More and more cases of this type built
up in science, the coordinate free formulations of general relativity
being a particularly significant instance.
Early on, Carnap argues that reformulations of the same results
in distinct linguistic frameworks are only syntactically distinct. He
proposes that he can remove the apparent conflicts between lin-
guistic frameworks by means of syntactic analysis and translation
rules. By 1938, as Carnap writes to Quine, he has run into problems
in inter-translating frameworks using only syntactic, extensional
logic. Influenced by Tarski, Carnap develops a semantic, intensional
approach, which quantifies over sentential variables. For instance,
such an analysis can yield sentences such as (expressed in rela-
tively ordinary language): ‘It is not the case that there exists an x
such that x = ‘‘The cat’s being alive” at time t’. Here ‘x’ is meant
to be analogous to a Wittgensteinian state of affairs, the referent
of an elementary proposition. In his discussion with Quine, Carnap
argues that such sentences are found in ordinary language:
I doubt whether sentence designata are not referred to in every-
day language. The customary grammar forbids also predicates
in noun position, but it replaces them by corresponding nouns
e.g. ‘red’ by ‘redness;’ in the same way it replaces sentences in
noun position by corresponding expressions as e.g. ‘my arrival’
or ‘his being opposed to this’. In any case I think the question
should be discussed much more and my view about it is not
at all definitive.47
Carnap’s idea is that semantic analysis of how sentences of a scien-
tific theory depict their content can yield transformation rules be-
tween frameworks. The idea is that a logical sentence refers to a
proposition, which is the stable content of the sentence that re-
mains the same, independent of the framework in which it is ex-
pressed. Semantic analysis of the logical sentences of a
framework, Carnap argues in the late 1930s and early 1940s, will
yield translation rules based on this stable propositional content.45 I am grateful to Clark Glymour for pointing out to me the significance of Russell’s ess
46 Russell (1997 [1945]), pp. 152–153.
47 Quine & Carnap (1990), p. 245, letter from Carnap to Quine, 11 February 1938.
48 Russell (1997 [1945]), p. 153.
49 Quine & Carnap (1990), p. 248, letter from Quine to Carnap, 15 February 1938.
50 As Pincock (2007) has emphasized, here Russell and Carnap disagree (Pincock, 2007,
whereas for Carnap all analysis takes place within some such framework. (For instance, an
within empirical psychology).
51 Carnap (1950), §2.Russell and Quine object to this move on similar, though dis-
tinct grounds. Russell argues that Carnap’s introduction of senten-
tial variables into semantics complicates his ontology:
A name, such as ‘Churchill’ or ‘Stalin’ or ‘Big Ben’, means a cer-
tain person or thing, but a sentence does not mean a definite
object. If I say ‘Churchill is Prime Minister’, I am not asserting
or naming some entity, ‘Churchill’s premiership’. We cannot
therefore treat the significance of sentences as something clo-
sely analogous to the significance of proper names. If ‘proposi-
tion’ is to mean ‘significance of a sentence’, we have on our
hands the problem of deciding what this can be.48
On similar grounds, Quine objects that Carnap is complicating his
ontology unnecessarily. Here Quine objects that Carnap is violating
Ockham’s razor: Carnap is adding an entity, a proposition, as the
referent of a sentence. Such entities, Quine observes, are not neces-
sary for classical mathematics.
Indeed, the latter [bound sentential variables] could even be
introduced by contextual definition, if they would be conve-
nient, so they would still have no status at the primitive
level . . . Your argument that everyday language does after all
support sentence-designata must, I guess, be admitted (con-
trary to my previous argument); but I suppose I am affected
mainly by Ockham’s razor.49
Quine argues that ‘convenience’ and simplicity (Ockham’s razor)
should drive the choice whether or not to allow sentence designata
into one’s semantics. Quine admits that if they were necessary, he
would allow for sentence designata, though reluctantly. In 1938,
Carnap thought sentence designata were necessary to giving trans-
lation rules, and so he defended them, though not robustly.
As Carnap says in his letter to Quine (cited above), his views on
semantics in 1938 were not definitive. In ‘Empiricism, Semantics,
and Ontology’, Carnap distinguishes between questions internal
to and external to a linguistic framework. Carnap argues that the
relation within a theory between a priori propositions and the re-
sults of the theory is meaningful and determinate. The choice be-
tween frameworks, including the choice to employ a framework
at all, is practical.50 Carnap retreats somewhat, from the goal of
accounting for the propositions of natural science as inter-translat-
able, to giving a semantic account of a subset of those propositions
that are common to linguistic frameworks.
Carnap’s mature distinction between internal and external
questions is a clear way to frame this early logical empiricist an-
swer to the problem of validity. The problem of validity, says Car-
nap, is a problem that it makes sense to pose only within a given
linguistic framework. Questions of the validity of an a priori rela-
tion are legitimate, and meaningful, within that linguistic frame-
work. Here Carnap is in agreement with Hertz and Wittgenstein,
that outside a given framework, questions of the validity of the
principles of construction of that framework have no meaning.
According to Carnap, the choice of linguistic framework, or even
the choice of whether to use language to refer to things at all, is
practical.51 Here is the legacy of Helmholtz in logical empiricism.
The decision to use signs to construct objects in scientific languageay in this connection.
pp. 127 ff.). For Russell, pragmatics is independent of a given linguistic framework,
alysis of a mental state that motivates someone to accept a theory might take place
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ence. It is appropriate, then, to give Helmholtz the last word:
Here the only valid advice is: have trust and act!52Acknowledgements
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